By Felipe Ruiz | June 24, 2020
Near the end of this year,
there will be a new presidential election in the
From the Democratic side,
Biden seems to be leading according to some early ratings,
competing with Trump on the Republican side seeking reelection.
This election process may occur amid the COVID-19 pandemic
that is currently affecting us. Thus,
considering that we aim to maintain safe distances to prevent contagion,
questions arise on how to carry out the voting processes.
Could it be somewhat more convenient
and more secure to perform such processes over the Internet?
A few days ago, the researchers Michael A. Specter, of MIT,
and Alex Halderman, of the University of Michigan,
published an article that reports how an online election
could be affected by undetected attackers.
These authors made the first review
explicitly focused on Democracy Live’s
used in different states on certain voting activities.
Using reverse engineering to analyze platform security,
Specter and Halderman found that
OmniBallot is vulnerable to specific attacks
that can mean alteration of votes or theft of personal data.
They also gave some recommendations
to take into account for the next elections.
Current health risks have led some states to consider the Internet
as a means of running the coming elections.
Generally, the Internet has been used to allow specific vulnerable populations
or those not present in the country to participate in elections.
Tools such as
OmniBallot have been used for these purposes.
OmniBallot is a web-based platform
that can serve for three modes of operations:
blank ballot delivery, ballot marking, and online voting.
Now, reportedly, it is going to be used for online voting for the first time
in Delaware, West Virginia, and New Jersey with larger groups of voters.
This is the riskiest mode in relation to cyberattacks.
Let’s clarify each
OmniBallot’s mode of operation:
Online blank ballot delivery: The voter downloads her corresponding blank ballot, and it is printed, manually marked, and physically returned to the election authorities.
Online ballot marking: The voter marks her ballot on the website and then downloads it to print it and return it physically. Some jurisdictions give the option to return it via fax or email.
Online ballot return (online voting): The voter marks her ballot
and transmits it to the authorities over the Internet
through a service of Democracy Live.
OmniBallot customers and in comparison with the two previous modes,
this is the least used.
Following ethical and legal principles,
Specter and Halderman limited their analysis
to the publicly available parts of
specifically the Delaware version.
Therefore, as a general description
OmniBallot architecture, they proposed the following:
After having a clear understanding of the platform’s architecture
and client-server interactions, the authors analyzed the risks
OmniBallot is used in each of the three modes mentioned above.
Before we talk about that, let’s state the possible attackers or adversaries:
First, adversaries may have access to the voter’s device.
These attackers could be system administrators, abusive partners,
or remote attackers that control certain malware,
and could modify
to alter the behavior of the web browser.
In second place are the attackers
with access to the server infrastructure of
These adversaries could be, for example,
internal staff from Democracy Live or Amazon, and external attackers
ready to access and affect the systems involved.
In third place are the adversaries with control of third-party code.
This involves attackers who may have access to third-party software
and services which
such as Google Analytics, AngularJS, reCAPTCHA, and Fingerprint JS.
Also, customers load some libraries from Amazon, Cloudflare, and Google,
where there could also be malicious subjects
willing to modify the
So, what could these attackers end up doing
in the different ways
Online blank ballot delivery: We can start with the fact that the attacker could manipulate the ballot design, for example, swapping or removing candidates. In a more difficult to detect manipulation, for instance, an attacker could even change bar codes to alter the records when tabulated by a scanner. On the other hand, there may be attacks not directed at the ballot itself but at the ballot return instructions. The attacker could make the ballot be sent to an inappropriate place, after knowing the voter’s site that is among the data verified by OmniBallot at the start. Additionally, the attacker could mail a different ballot (following their preferences) to the appropriate place employing the voter’s data.
Online ballot marking: Here, the attacker could know the voter’s selection before the ballot’s generation, and from this, modify that particular ballot to suppress the vote for a specific candidate. Attacks may also involve reordering the candidates and swapping the barcodes linked to each of them. In these online marking cases, the attacker could also simply alter the voter’s marking and select a different candidate. And while some might notice the change, many others would not detect the errors on their ballots and return them as they are.
Online ballot return:
OmniBallot does not use
the "end-to-end verifiability (E2E-V)" approach
for a secure remote voting protocol.
Computer scientists have been working on it for several decades,
and to some extent, it is the most recommended approach.
It "allows each voter to independently check
that their vote is correctly recorded and included in the election result."
OmniBallot uses a protocol in which no one can verify
that what the voters gave as a selection
is the same as what the officials received.
Hence the possibility of the attacker changing the votes without being noticed.
Finally, a risk associated with all modes of operation is the collection and storage of privacy-sensitive data, including names, addresses, and dates.
Apparently, Democracy Live’s security controls are limited.
Following the authors' recommendations,
OmniBallot’s online ballot return should be eliminated,
and the physical ballot return
should be improved on accessibility and efficiency.
Also, online marking should be offered only to voters
who have this mode as necessary to join the elections.
Moreover, officials should carry out risk-limiting audits (RLAs)
to test at least in part the accuracy of the computers' work.
Additionally, Democracy Live could reduce risks
eliminating unnecessary reliance on third parties
that may constitute multiple routes of attack.
And as a final tip related to some legal protections,
informing voters of the limitations on the use of their data
by Democracy Live and third parties.
The fact is that such data should only be used for the election process.
The public security review of
OmniBallot by security experts
is something of high value when its use
—due to a positive record in much smaller procedures—
is under consideration for the next presidential election.
In the end, they warn us that
with such high risks of election outcomes being altered without detection,
and without sufficient tools to mitigate those risks,
it is best that
OmniBallot’s (or any similar voting platform’s)
online ballot return doesn’t become the default voting process.
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