
Calix Gigacenter ONT - Command Injection
Discovered by

External Pentester
Summary
Full name
Command Injection in Calix Gigacenter ONT
Code name
State
Public
Release date
9 de set. de 2025
Affected product
Calix GigaCenter ONT
Vendor
Calix
Affected version(s)
844E, 844G, 844GE, and 854GE
Fixed version(s)
R12.2.13.4 patch available to authorised users
Vulnerability name
OS Command Injection
Vulnerability type
Remotely exploitable
Yes
CVSS v4.0 vector string
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CVSS v4.0 base score
8.5
Exploit available
Yes
CVE ID(s)
Description
The Calix GigaCenter ONT 844E, 844G, 844GE, and 854GE are affected for a command injection. This vulnerability exists in the Quantenna SoC firmware web interface at tools_command.php accessible via the Quantenna device's web interface over its IP address. The vulnerability allows authenticated attackers with 'super' user credentials to execute arbitrary OS commands through improper input validation, potentially leading to full system compromise.
Vulnerability
Steps to reproduce the vulnerability:
Access the Quantenna web app with the "super" user credentials.
Check the firmware file '/var/www/tools_command.php', where the command injection occurs.
Finally, inject the command to get a shell on the router.
PoC
An exploit has been created for Python that automates the login process using the same administrative credentials on all devices with a Quantenna SoC. It also installs a backdoor to access a shell on port 4444:
Evidence of Exploitation
Access the web application with credentials (default super:super):


The Command injection is present in the file “/var/www/tools_command.php”, as shown below:




Video: RCE + Backdoor + PSK leak:
Our security policy
We have reserved the ID CVE-2025-54084 to refer to this issue from now on.
System Information
Calix GigaCenter ONT 844E, 844G, 844GE, and 854GE.
Firmware version 4.16L.05xponpatch2 (build timestamp 230328_1137)
References
Vendor: https://www.calix.com
Security: https://www.calix.com/security.html
Mitigation
This issue is resolved in the R12.2.13.4 patch available to authorised users. Subscribers with concerns about the security of the ONT servicing their premises should contact their BSP to push the update, as these devices are not licensed to consumers.
Credits
The vulnerability was discovered by Danilo Erazo, an independent security researcher.
Timeline
16 de fev. de 2025
Vulnerability discovered
21 de jul. de 2025
Vendor contacted
1 de ago. de 2025
Vendor replied
1 de ago. de 2025
Vendor confirmed
5 de set. de 2025
Vulnerability patched
9 de set. de 2025
Public disclosure
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